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Abstract 
A remarkable feature of Canada’s external relations in the years between the two 
world wars of the twentieth century is the extent to which Canada’s conduct and 
speeches by its representatives on international affairs were dominated by 
imagery of North American harmony.  Past clashes, most notably the War of 
1812, or simply differences of views were forgotten or overlooked in the 
construction of a myth that served to justify inaction and the denial of 
commitments in imperial and world affairs.  An aloof, unhelpful stance 
internationally was depicted more positively as a worthy example of peaceful 
attitudes and conduct. Thus, the inter-war period was dominated by rhetoric about 
‘the longest undefended border in the world,’ ‘[more than a] century of peace in 
North America,’ 
and the contrast between the ‘New World’ and the ‘Old World’ in world affairs.  
No Canadian speech in an international forum seemed complete without some 
variation on these themes and without an admonition to Europeans and other 
miscreants to settle disputes by conciliation, negotiation and arbitration – rather 
than resort to war – as was the tradition in relations between Canada and the 
United States. This paper deals with the development, application and effect in 
the inter-war period of the lessons supposedly drawn from the experience and 
especially the aftermath of the War of 1812. 
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For historians and other commentators, the rhetoric employed by Canadian 
politicians, statesmen and diplomats to articulate and defend a distinct perspective 
on world affairs between the two world wars of the twentieth century has inspired 
fascination, bemusement and even condemnation for its complacent and self-
satisfied tone, as well as for its misrepresentation of the past.  Not for the last 
time, speech-writers and speakers seemed fonder of myth than of history.  There 
was a profound and pervasive tendency to depict North America – and especially 
the relations between Canada and the United States – as different from Europe, 
with a questionable interpretation of the historical experience cited as evidence of 
that distinction.  Most analysts have noted how this depiction of continental 
harmony was employed to justify a negative approach to international obligations. 
What has attracted less attention have been the specific content and the ultimate 
inspiration for this curious, repetitious and often sanctimonious flow of words.  In 
various international settings, Canadian speakers aimed to correct what they 
regarded as the misguided and ultimately destructive behaviour of those leaders 
and nations with whom they assembled at conferences. To that end, Canada’s 
relations with the United States were presented as a model for others to emulate. 
That these efforts at behavioural correction conspicuously failed does not lessen 
what we can learn about Canadian attitudes from a closer look at the 
circumstances and the texts of the pronouncements.   
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This paper will review several key speeches delivered on behalf of the 
Canadian government at significant international meetings between 1919 and 
1939, then link these texts to persistent and often persuasive (at least for 
Canadians) myths about Canada’s relations with the United States and especially 
about the supposed legacy of the War of 1812 and its aftermath.  Thus, this 
commentary does not deal with that conflict, nor with the scholarly evaluation of 
it and its actual consequences.  Instead, it examines how the past was viewed and 
arguably distorted through the lens of later politics and diplomacy.  In other 
words, its focus is on the depiction of history and characterization of its meaning 
and significance by representatives of Canada at international gatherings, 
including imperial and international conferences as well as meetings of the 
League of Nations.  In those distinctly non-academic settings, with little fear of 
contradiction by others in the audience more knowledgeable than themselves, 
Canadian politicians and diplomats attempted to posit ‘lessons of the past’ for the 
edification and improvement of their listeners.  The period since the end of the 
War of 1812 was reinterpreted and presented as an instructive example for the rest 
of the world about how to get along with your neighbour.  This notion of learning 
from the experience and consequences of an earlier war had been articulated 
before the Great War, but it became even more resonant after that devastating 
conflict.   
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Some of the themes favoured by Canadian speech-writers and speakers in 
the 1920s and 1930s, which have often been attributed to an understandable 
revulsion following the colossal losses of the Great War, were actually anticipated 
by American, British and Canadian celebrants of the centenary of the War of 
1812, before the first world war of the twentieth century had exacted its toll.  As it 
turned out, many of the projects proposed for that commemoration were delayed 
or abandoned in response to contemporary circumstances.2  Consequently, some 
of the intended themes received less attention than anticipated by the organizers, 
though seeds may have been planted then which possibly germinated a decade 
later.  One difficulty for the celebrants was a perennial one – insufficient public 
and political interest to justify enough funds for the grander plans for the 
commemoration.  More significantly, global tensions altered the context for the 
planned activities, though many still went forward.  The celebration of the 
centenary of the War of 1812, which had been devised by many of the participants 
as a celebration of peace and of the effective use of arbitration to settle 
international disputes, came amid rising tensions in Europe, which would prompt 
the outbreak of the Great War two years later.   
As for the North American context, the anniversary came after a decade of 
Anglo-American rapprochement and an overall settlement of most differences in 
relations between Canada and the United States.  That harmonious trend seems 
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even more remarkable when one considers that the twentieth century had begun 
inauspiciously with a serious clash over the boundary between Alaska and 
Canadian territory, with heated rhetoric on both sides of the border as Canadian 
and American politicians perceived advantages to be gained from adversarial 
nationalistic stances.  Certainly the truculent political speeches during that episode 
did not convey any sense of continental understanding or harmony.  After that 
seemingly ill-starred beginning, however, the remainder of the first decade of the 
century had witnessed a deliberate and remarkably effective ‘clearing of the slate’ 
with respect to Canadian-American disagreements. That American-initiated 
process culminated in the signature of the Boundary Waters Treaty and the 
creation of the International Joint Commission in 1909.3  Questions that had been 
posed intermittently and inconclusively for years in bilateral relations were 
answered in practical and reasonable ways, to the satisfaction of leaders in both 
countries.  By the end of this process, there were hardly any noteworthy or 
consequential disputes outstanding between the two countries.  
That decade was also one of unprecedented growth and prosperity for 
Canada.  Those exceptional circumstances undoubtedly contributed to 
extraordinary national self-confidence, which was predictably reflected in the 
speeches and statements of politicians and pundits, who competed for the most 
outrageously optimistic forecasts of Canada’s future.  In comparison with some of 
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those claims, Prime Minister Sir Wilfrid Laurier’s opt-repeated assertion, with 
minor variations in phrasing, that the twentieth century ‘would belong to Canada,’ 
seems rather tentative and modest.  Likely that positive frame of mind lessened 
chronic anxiety in the Dominion about fair treatment in dealings with the United 
States and made it easier to resolve continental issues. 
Even so, the year before the centenary saw a very different mood 
prevailing north of the border.4 Curiously, this arose in large part from a 
controversial effort to draw the countries even closer together economically.  In 
1911, on the eve of the commemoration, there had been an especially acrimonious 
general election in Canada marked by strident appeals to pro-imperial and anti-
American sentiment.  Patriotic fervour had been aroused in English Canada by the 
cautious response of Laurier’s government to the Anglo-German naval crisis.  
Those concerns about loyalty were then compounded by a proposed deal for 
reciprocity in trade between Canada and the United States, which was seen by 
some as threatening Canada’s sheltered manufacturing sector as well as the 
Dominion’s ties to Britain.   
Both sides in this contest raised fundamental issues of identity and loyalty 
in English-speaking Canada. Appeals by opponents of the trade deal for 
Canadians not to turn their backs on Britain found a receptive audience.  
Proponents had a harder time explaining why a prosperous Canada needed such a 
110 
 
deal, though it was strongly supported by farmers, especially in western Canada.  
Unwise remarks by American politicians about the implications of the pact for 
Canada’s future as a sovereign state had reawakened dormant fears of annexation 
and prompted effusions of pro-imperial ‘patriotic’ sentiment in English Canada.  
Thus, the cry of ‘no truck nor trade with the Yankees’ uttered by foes of 
reciprocity apparently struck a responsive chord.  Moreover, much of the 
electorate was evidently anxious about any major shift in commercial policy when 
the country had experienced more than a decade of good fortune under the current 
regime – why mess with success?  As for attitudes in Quebec, nationalists there 
opposed even the Liberal government’s modest commitment to a Canadian navy 
as an unwelcome and burdensome form of colonial tribute.  To thwart that 
initiative, they were prepared to risk political collaboration with more imperially-
minded Tories.  This lethal combination of moods, which compounded the 
accumulated political liabilities from fifteen years in office, led to the defeat of 
Laurier’s government, including the first, but not the last, loss in his constituency 
for a ministerial novice, William Lyon Mackenzie King, who learned his own 
lessons from this experience.5 
As much as possible, celebrants of the centenary of the War of 1812, 
including the new Canadian prime minister, Robert Laird Borden, attempted to 
dampen down the anti-American tone which had been so evident in the election 
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campaign and to draw more favourable lessons from their appreciation of past 
experience.  Unfortunately, the atmosphere did not necessarily improve a great 
deal after the anniversary celebrations were over.  The respective responses of the 
two countries to the outbreak of the Great War demonstrated the differences 
between the neighbours, not the commonalities.  When the war began, with 
Canada automatically a belligerent as a member of the British Empire, American 
neutrality and pervasive rumours in Canada of espionage and sabotage by cross-
border agents of German descent worsened popular attitudes and complicated 
relations between the countries.6   
Eventual American entry into the war, as well as subsequent close 
collaboration, eased those tensions.  Even so, there was some resentment in 
Canada when the late entrant in the war, the United States, opposed what 
Canadians believed was appropriate representation for their country at the Paris 
Peace Conference and membership in the League of Nations, that ill-fated product 
of the Treaty of Versailles.7  Canadian pundits bitterly recalled that, for much of 
the war, as one put it, ‘America counted her profits, while Canada buried her 
dead.’8  In other words, the overall experience of the Great War did not 
necessarily bolster the positive continental developments and sympathetic 
attitudes that preceded it.  However, it was soon evident that the longer-term 
trends in continental relations could not be reversed, or even stalled, by these 
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differences.  Instead, the political, economic and social factors that drew the 
countries together soon had an obvious impact on how Canadians defined and 
described their place in the world.  Against the seemingly less favourable 
backdrop of developments surrounding the Great War, it is noteworthy to what 
extent the inter-war conduct of Canada and speeches by its representatives on 
international affairs were dominated by the appreciation of shared values and 
interests on both sides of the border.   
Especially when speaking abroad, there was a marked tendency to convey 
an impression of idyllic harmony between the neighbours and to employ this 
image as proof of the moral superiority of North America (sometimes enlarged to 
the New World generally).  Past clashes or seemingly primordial differences (such 
as arguments between Canadians and Americans over the superiority of their 
respective forms of government) were forgotten or overlooked in constructing and 
repeating a myth of shared beliefs and concerted actions.  For some, that notion of 
North American distinctiveness ultimately served to justify inaction in the face of 
overseas crises – which were so clearly the fault of others – and the refusal of 
responsibilities or obligations in imperial as well as in world affairs.  For most in 
English Canada, however, this sense of detachment, which was possible in quieter 
times, did not withstand the searing impact of the crises that preceded the 
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outbreak of the Second World War and the perceived threat to the United 
Kingdom.   
Even so, it is worthwhile to look more closely at the rhetoric of the inter-
war years and its implications.  In that setting, history was re-written – or simply 
misrepresented in speeches – to serve the current aims of the Canadian 
government and to excuse an inglorious if temporary retreat into a North 
American redoubt.  In scholarship and popular discourse, the overwhelming 
emphasis was on the progressive development of better relations between Canada 
and the United States over the years.  Tendencies which would later be seen more 
critically were often depicted favourably.  Thus, the neglect of national defence by 
successive Canadian governments, which could more accurately be attributed to a 
combination of parsimony, complacency and war-weariness – compounded by a 
recognition of the military futility of protecting the country against its powerful 
neighbour – was now recast as evidence of longstanding continental harmony.9  In 
fact, military expenditures had been scaled back to the point of dangerous neglect 
for fiscal reasons, as part of the overall effort to overcome the legacy of debt from 
a costly overseas war and later to deal with the costs of the Great Depression.  
That approach was made easier by a popular but misplaced faith in the efficacy of 
voluntary responses by civilian recruits to major crises rather than reliance on 
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permanent forces for security.  That ‘militia myth’ also owed its origins to an 
incomplete understanding of how the War of 1812 had been fought and decided.10 
At the League of Nations and in other settings, including imperial 
conferences, Canadian representatives often presumed to speak as well for the 
absent Americans.  At times, other delegates could be forgiven for wondering 
aloud for which country the Canadians spoke.  In fact, at the Imperial Conference 
of 1921, the truculent Australian prime minister, Billy Hughes, questioned whose 
policy the Canadian prime minister, Arthur Meighen, advocated – that of the 
British Empire or that of the United States.11  For his part, Meighen contended 
that Canada’s relations with the United States ‘have no parallel anywhere between 
any British Dominion and any other country’ and that they ‘are in their very nature 
so vast and so vital to us that the control of those relations has become and must 
remain a matter incident to our autonomy.’12  Consequently, Canada’s stake in 
‘British-American friendship’ was exceptional and its vulnerability in the event of 
a breach was much greater than that of Australia or any other part of the Empire 
and Commonwealth.  In Meighen’s reckoning, what had happened since the end 
of the War of 1812 vindicated this assessment and justified a dominant voice for 
Canada in shaping imperial relations with the Great Republic.13 Hughes and 
others categorically rejected this assertion, but Meighen was unshaken in his 
belief. 
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As that exchange of views indicates, this stance transcended partisan 
divisions in Canada.  After all, though the governments of King would be most 
closely identified with the articulation of a distinctly North American viewpoint, it 
was Meighen, not King, who first affirmed this distinction in an imperial setting.  
Within the context of the British Empire and Commonwealth, this positive 
continental outlook also reinforced a push for greater autonomy -- constitutionally 
and diplomatically -- for Canada.14 That tendency was certainly more pronounced 
when the Liberals were in power.  In light of the overall theme of this article, it is 
noteworthy that, when King first asserted Canada’s separate diplomatic identity, 
he proposed renewal of the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817, which had limited 
naval armaments on the Great Lakes after the War of 1812, as a symbolic 
expression of continental concord as well as national autonomy.  When that 
initiative went nowhere, King shifted his attention to coastal fisheries accords.15 
In Geneva, this emphasis on North American harmony – and the 
presumption to speak also for the United States – provided a rationale for aloof or 
negative policies for Canada.  That was evident as Canadian delegates 
endeavoured successively to delete, amend or ‘interpret’ the commitment to 
collective security expressed in article X of the covenant of the League of Nations. 
While other countries identified that provision as the key to the supranational 
authority and potential effectiveness and credibility of the new institution, as well 
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as the protection of vulnerable smaller states, Canada regarded it as a dangerous 
liability.  Canadian representatives were determined to limit the obligations of 
Canada, which had less need of help from others.16  However, that disengaged 
attitude was also noticeable in other evasions of responsibility for the security of 
those nations less favourably located.  Whether in London or in Geneva – or in the 
safe confines of the House of Commons in Ottawa – this unhelpful posture was 
not presented as a denial of international commitments by the Canadian 
government.  Instead, emphasis was placed on the absence of any threat to 
Canada; were others to follow its worthy example, so it was argued, their need for 
help would likewise be diminished and the world would undoubtedly be a better 
place. 
Whatever the explanation or rationale, Canadian political and diplomatic 
rhetoric between the First and Second World Wars was dominated by a heady 
blend of complacency and sanctimony which contrasted the peace and harmony 
on the west side of the Atlantic (and the east side of the Pacific, though that shore 
was mentioned less often) with the dreadful and atavistic state of affairs on the 
opposite coast and further inland.  Canadian speech-writers and speakers 
composed and rehearsed a few dominant themes on the subject of international 
relations, which were interwoven in texts and frequently repeated for the 
edification of their audiences.   
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One unifying idea, blame Europe, was present from the start.  At the first 
assembly of the League of Nations in 1920, a Canadian delegate, Newton W. 
Rowell, pointedly remarked that ‘it was European policy, European 
statesmanship, European ambition, that drenched this world with blood and from 
which we are still suffering and will suffer for generations.’17 That terrible legacy 
of the Great War -- and the belief that it was all Europe’s fault -- provided the 
immediate background for Canadian speeches on world affairs for the next two 
decades. 
With some reliance on the mainstays of pithy commentary and public 
speeches -- gross over-simplification and crass generalization -- the following may 
be presented as a template for the prototypical speech by a Canadian 
representative in any international forum on world affairs from 1919 to 1939.  
With minor variations in tone and emphasis, it was employed by Liberal and 
Conservative speakers alike.  Perhaps the most notorious theme – and certainly 
the one with the longest shelf life (though rarely heard lately, at least since the 
events of 11 September 2001) – was the boastful description of the Canadian-
American frontier as ‘the longest undefended border in the world.’18 Another 
hardy perennial, with the specific phrasing adjusted periodically to take account of 
the passage of time, was the reference to ‘[more than] a century of peace in North 
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America.’  Associated with that notion was the depiction of the Rush-Bagot 
Agreement as the oldest and most successful disarmament treaty in the world.   
Probably the most popular -- and arguably primordial -- leit-motif in the 
limited repertoire of Canadian orators, however, was the vivid contrast in attitudes 
and conduct between the ‘New World’ and the ‘Old World’ in international 
relations, most evident in the clashes that prompted the Great War, with all of its 
devastating consequences.  By implication -- and sometimes more explicitly as a 
lesson to be learned -- this difference in outlook and experience was attributed to 
the moral superiority of North America.  As James Eayrs has noted, however, this 
‘moralizing’ led not to ‘engagement’ or constructive leadership but to ‘isolation’ 
and denial of responsibility.  As he put it so evocatively, evidently ‘the first duty 
of the missionary was to stay out of the cannibal’s pot.’19 Words, not deeds, were 
what distinguished Canada and its delegates. No Canadian speech in an 
international forum was complete without these themes and without an 
accompanying admonition to Europeans and other wilful and unrepentant sinners 
to settle disputes by conciliation, negotiation and arbitration – not resort to war.  
In other words, they should follow the virtuous North American example.  There 
were occasional bouts of originality in speech-writing and speaking, but those 
brief departures from the script did not usually contradict the basic messages.  
More often, these were differences in phraseology, not sentiment or belief.  Let 
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me illustrate this argument with a few major examples, then point out some flaws 
in the imagery so frequently presented. 
One of the major initiatives after the Great War to assure peace in Europe 
was the Geneva Protocol (or Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes).  Perhaps the only memorable words ever uttered by Senator Raoul 
Dandurand, who often represented Canada with grace and quiet dignity at the 
League of Nations, came when he explained why Canada would not sign the 
protocol, though he insisted that the Canadian government and people 
wholeheartedly supported its aims.  In his remarks, Dandurand compared the pact 
to an insurance policy against fire – as befits an uneasy and fundamentally 
conservative people, Canadians often think about insurance.  In this metaphor, the 
obligations of signatories for collective security corresponded to the premiums 
levied to fund a group insurance policy.  Dandurand then argued that Canada’s 
risks were comparatively low, almost non-existent, so that it should not have to 
pay the same premium as others who were much more likely to need help.  ‘We 
live in a fire-proof house, far from inflammable materials,’ he declaimed.  For 
those few in his audience who missed the key point, Dandurand reminded them 
that ‘a vast ocean separates us from Europe,’ otherwise known as the most likely 
source of conflagration. 
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Notwithstanding that brief flurry of originality, the rest of Dandurand’s 
speech faithfully repeated the familiar nostrums.  Thus, he highlighted the 
peaceful settlement of disputes between Canada and the United States, as well as 
the extent of disarmament in North America.  Dandurand then tweaked the 
customary passage about the peaceful continent: ‘Not only have we had a hundred 
years of peace on our borders, but we think in terms of peace, while Europe, an 
armed camp, thinks in terms of war.’20  Somewhat unfairly, Dandurand’s 
memorable phrase about a ‘fireproof house’ has earned him a reputation as a 
spokesman for isolationism.  In fact, he was sympathetic to the goals of the league 
and of the protocol, but simply worried about the implications for Canada of an 
unlimited obligation to intervene abroad.  King later confirmed that Canada would 
not sign the protocol, though he insisted that ‘Canada should continue to give 
wholehearted support to the League of Nations,’ a questionable reassurance at 
best, given Canada’s track record and his own attitudes.21  
King first spoke to the assembly of the league in September 1928, not long 
after he and other world leaders had renounced war as an instrument of national 
policy by signing the Multilateral Treaty for the Renunciation of War (Pact of 
Paris or Kellogg-Briand Pact).  His speech in Geneva unsurprisingly included all 
of the requisite references to Canadian-American harmony.  Indeed, the principal 
subject of his remarks to the assembly was the relationship between Canada and 
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the United States.  To the Canadian prime minister, as he informed his listeners, it 
was an exemplar and an application of the principles embodied in the recent 
accord.  Thus, the more familiar ‘century of peace’ was rephrased as one hundred 
years of the renunciation of war between Canada and the United States.  The 
phrase ‘undefended frontier’ was employed twice, and minor variations on it 
twice more.  Both the Rush-Bagot Agreement and the International Joint 
Commission, those instruments of continental concord, were explained carefully 
and at length to an undoubtedly rapt audience.  With more conviction than 
economic evidence (or forecasting ability), King also attributed his country’s 
prosperity and fiscal soundness to the money saved by not spending ‘a single 
dollar through fear of American aggression.’  The finance minister of a disarmed 
Canada, King argued, found better ways to spend public funds and imposed a 
lesser burden on Canadian taxpayers than his counterparts elsewhere.22   
Later, King described parliamentary endorsement of the Pact of Paris as 
simply approving ‘a policy which, as regards Canada in its relations with the 
country to the south, has been in existence for more than a hundred years.’23  In 
words that have been interpreted as cynical, King’s closest adviser and the 
principal author of the prime minister’s speeches, O. D. Skelton, described the 
treaty as a ‘verbal flourish.’  To his wife, he described it simply as a ‘grand 
gesture.’  No doubt with the prime minister’s chronic worries about the risks of 
overseas entanglements in mind, Skelton suggested to King that it could do no 
harm to sign it, as it entailed no meaningful obligations and consequently was 
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harmless.24  In fact, any cynicism about the Kellogg-Briand Pact was borne out by 
events, as a higher proportion of signatories than non-signatories eventually 
fought in the Second World War. At the League Assembly in 1930, curiously, it 
was the French delegate, Aristide Briand, not the Canadian delegate, former prime 
minister Sir Robert Borden, who stressed Canada’s advantageous location.  
Borden had scolded signatories of the Pact of Paris for continuing to rely on 
armaments for security.  Briand pointedly noted that Canada was among ‘the 
nations with nothing to fear, who live in a state of blissful well-being remote from 
danger’ -- not to praise the North American example but as a plea for better 
understanding from Canadians of justifiable French fears, particularly those 
inspired by the rise of the National Socialists in Germany.25   
On occasion, Canadian delegates conceded that their country’s peculiar 
advantages of geography, history and other circumstances made it inappropriate 
for them to preach to those less fortunate, as when Sir George Perley described 
Canada’s favourable location when he spoke at the Disarmament Conference in 
Geneva in 1932.  ‘On the east and west we face the ocean; on the north, the arctic 
seas.  On the south we have as our neighbour a great and friendly nation, with 
whom we have developed machinery for arbitration and conciliation, the 
successful functioning of which is causing the peaceful settlement of disputes 
between us (and we have many of them) to become a habit rather than an event.’26  
In fact, Perley’s speech was also noteworthy for its omission of the hackneyed 
references to Canada’s relations with the United States.  ‘We have been 
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congratulated by all and sundry in Geneva,’ one of his departmental advisers, 
Lester Pearson, reported, ‘on the fact that it is the first Canadian deliverance for 
some years which has not mentioned one or all of “the hundred years,” “the three 
thousand miles” or “the International Joint Commission.”’27 
Originality on the part of its representatives in Geneva, however, was not 
always valued by their superiors in Ottawa.  In fact, initiatives by C. H. Cahan in 
1932 and by W. A. Riddell in 1935 ensnared the Canadian government in 
controversy.28  Curiously, Cahan’s infamous intervention in the debate over 
Japan’s conquest of Manchuria – when he seemed to question China’s eligibility 
for membership of the league and therefore its worthiness for support from other 
members – still managed to include, on the recommendation of his official 
advisers, a suggestion of ‘a permanent body on the lines of our International Joint 
Commission’ to address differences between China and Japan.29  For his part, 
Prime Minister R. B. Bennett was neither original nor controversial when he 
attended the league assembly in 1934, as he was stricken with influenza ‘and took 
no significant part in the discussions.’30 
In fact, silence on international questions was another way in which 
Canadian delegations avoided or limited Canada’s commitments to the League of 
Nations and its members.  Unfortunately for his subsequent career, Riddell did not 
keep quiet as the league deliberated over how to respond to a long-anticipated 
clash in October 1935.  Riddell’s pursuit of a bold policy of stronger sanctions 
against Italy over its invasion of Ethiopia, in the midst of a change of government 
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in Canada and in apparent defiance of contrary instructions, ultimately prompted 
authorities in Ottawa to disavow his initiative.31 
When King spoke to the League of Nations for the second and last time, in 
September 1936, he was less inclined than before to preach about the North 
American model.  On the contrary, his speech acknowledged the extent to which 
Canada was favoured by geography and circumstances, especially when 
contrasted to the problematic situation in Europe.  Perhaps because the familiar 
themes had been repeated so often by Canadian representatives, the standard 
references were made only indirectly, in considering the predicament of less 
fortunate European nations.  ‘We recognize the special conditions that face a great 
part of Europe, the crowded populations, the scores of dividing frontiers, the bitter 
memories which zealots of nationalism will not let die, the heritage of ancient 
privilege and of class division, the unrest resulting from the redrawing of political 
boundaries, and the upheaval in the social structure which the great war brought in 
its train,’ King conceded.  ‘We recognize that we in Canada have been fortunate 
both in our neighbours and in our lack of neighbours, and we agree that we cannot 
reasonably expect our relations and our attitude to be wholly duplicated 
elsewhere.’  
Even so, King deplored any resort to sanctions to enforce the will of the 
majority of league members and reaffirmed his support for ‘a policy of non-
interference in the domestic arrangements of other nations,’ however much their 
conditions and prospects would likely be improved by following the example of 
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North America.  Canada was evidently satisfied with the status quo on its own 
continent, but it opposed its enforcement in Europe with the authority of the 
League of Nations.  Moreover, its denial of the national implications of 
international collective security, as represented by commitments to the league, did 
not seem to constrain Canada and its representatives from advising the league and 
its members on how best to fulfil its purposes.32  The stanza may have changed, 
but the chorus remained the same. 
Other, less prominent, Canadian speakers played variations on these 
themes.  What remained consistent was the extent to which the experience of the 
War of 1812 and the settlement of that conflict, as interpreted more than a century 
later, helped to shape a redefinition of North American exceptionalism and to 
justify caution and an attempt at disengagement from world affairs in this period.  
Indeed, academic surveys of the history of Canadian-American relations published 
between the wars also tended to stress ‘the long heritage of unbroken peace 
between the two countries’ and the ‘undefended frontier’ as themes.33  Moreover, 
the greatest bilateral historical project – the Carnegie series on Canadian-
American relations – was a celebration of continental inter-relationships and 
overall accord.  That monumental and unprecedented undertaking demonstrated in 
multiple volumes the myriad inter-connections of the two countries as well as the 
gradual development and strengthening of shared experiences and a common 
outlook.  In that context, the end of the War of 1812 had marked the beginning of 
a mutually beneficial era of peace and growth.  
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Even so, the close neighbours again responded differently to the renewed 
outbreak of hostilities in Europe in September 1939.  That attests to the power of 
the other dominant force in Canada’s external relations – its imperial ties.  
Patriotic sentiment in English Canada would not allow the Canadian government, 
whatever its doubts or preferences, to stay out of a major war in which Britain was 
involved.  For all of the inter-war rhetoric about a distinctly North American 
outlook, Canadians still viewed the world in 1939 largely through the lens of 
British attitudes, policies, and commitments.  A phrase from King’s diary, which 
was later repeated in his speeches, summed up that reality.  Canada must stand ‘at 
the side of Britain’ in a just cause, as he put it.  As had been the case 25 years 
earlier, Canadians and their leaders reacted to overseas events very differently 
from their close neighbours. 
 * * * * * 
As we have seen, the speeches of the inter-war period tended to focus not 
on the war itself – which has been interpreted very differently over the years – but 
on the peace that followed, with mythology favoured over history.  Nearly sixty 
years ago, the great Canadian military historian, Colonel C. P. Stacey, who had 
earlier punctured the prevalent views with his doctoral thesis on the British army 
in North America, published a brief study of The Undefended Border: Myth and 
Reality, which noted, inter alia, the futile attempts to fortify the border and 
otherwise prepare for a future war.  That ultimately led to the sensible conclusion 
that the task was impossible and that peaceful relations through diplomacy and 
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settlement of differences was ultimately more likely to be effective and certainly 
would be much cheaper.   
As Stacey pointed out, there were still significant tensions along the border 
after the Treaty of Ghent, most obviously during the American civil war and 
afterward, when the Fenian Brotherhood attempted to conquer Canada.  There 
were also intermittent strains and ill-feeling, particularly where boundaries were 
uncertain or ill-defined, when exploitation of resources on land or at sea was 
subject to dispute over control and benefit, or when British and American interests 
and perspectives clashed on the wider world stage with local repercussions.  
Perhaps the most important lesson (one so often forgotten) to be learned from 
Stacey’s analysis was simply about the risks associated with attempting to fit the 
past into a mould shaped by later biases and unhistorical judgments.34  
Notwithstanding such advice, the bicentennial proceedings have demonstrated 
once more that history has been viewed, some would contend distorted, by the 
lens of the present.  Whatever the evidence or likely shelf-life of more recent 
reinterpretations, however, the inter-war speeches certainly demonstrated, perhaps 
conclusively, that myth has a greater popular appeal than history! 
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